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DOES PUBLIC CHOICE THEORYJUSTIFY
JUDICIAL ACTISM AFTER ALL?
THOMAS W. MERP*

Some legal scholars have argued that public choice theory
justifies certain kinds of judicial activism.' Others have said it
does not.2 Given the present state of the debate, it would appear
that those finding no necessary support forjudicial activism have
the stronger argument. I will suggest, however, that if we tweak
the analysis a little further, it may- turn out that public choice
theory provides limited support for judicial activism after all.
From an economic perspective-which is to say, the public
choice perspective-it may be useful to think ofjudicial activism
as part of a larger market in which a product called "law change"
is bought and sold This market has many potential buyers, in
the form of the interest groups to which the previous panelists
have already referred. Virtually every group has some change in
law it would like to see adopted, whether it be producer groups
that would like to see new limitations on entry by potential
competitors, or environmental groups that would like to see new
limitations on the development of natural resources.
On the seller side, we can simplify the analysis by assuming

that there are only two firms in the market for law change-the
legislature and the courts. We can then reformulate the inquiry
as follows: what sorts of factors will determine the demand for

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Thanks to Ian Ayres
and Eric Rasmusen for their suggestions.
1. See, eg., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (drawing in part on public choice ideas to support wide-

ranging judicial activism under the Takings Clause); Jerry L Mashaw, Constitutional
Deregulation:Notes Toward aPublic,PublicLaw, 54 TUL L REV. 849 (1980) (using interest
group analysis tojustlify more intrusivejudicial review of legislation for rationality).
2. See NEIL IL KO~mSAR, IMPERPEcr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Einer R. Elhauge, DoesInerest Graup TheoryJusaf

MoreIntrsivefudicialRview , 101 YALELJ. 31 (1991).
3. For present purposes, I will definejudicial activism broadly to indude any change
in the law by courts, whether produced by the overruling of precedent or by some kind
of novel interpretation of the law that has not been enunciated before.
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and supply of law changes from the courts-that is, the demand
for and supply of judicial activism-as opposed to the demand
for and supply of law changes from the legislature?
The demand side of the equation has been pretty thoroughly
analyzed by public choice scholars. Building on Mancur Olson's
pioneering account, 4 we can say that a group's demand for law
change is a function of its ability to organize for collective
action. That ability, in turn, is a function of such variables as the
per capita stakes of the individuals who make up the group, and
whether the group has a preexisting associational structure.5
The following example can be used to illustrate Olson's
analysis of group demand. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
currently maintains a system of annually-adjusted quotas on the
importation of sugar cane. Consumers as a group would benefit
from raising the quotas: more imported sugar cane would
increase the supply of refined sugar, which would in turn slightly
lower the price of Frosted Flakes and Cokes. American farmers
who grow sugar beets and sugar cane, however, would lose
revenues if the quotas were raised: more imported sugar cane
would lower prices for domestic producers.
Olson's theory predicts that consumers will transmit a very
weak demand for raising the quotas. Consumers are an
extremely large group, and the savings to any individual
consumer from a liberalization in the quotas would amount to
only a few dollars a year. This will make it very hard for
consumers to get organized and raise resources for collective
action. No consumer has a strong incentive to pay much
attention to the issue, and consequently free riding will be
rampant if any collective action is attempted. Moreover, there is
no preexisting associational structure of consumers devoted to
this particular issue.
Domestic sugar beet and sugar cane farmers, in contrast, are a
much smaller group, with much higher per capita stakes. For
them, the current system of quotas translates into thousands of
dollars a year in additional revenues. Moreover, these farmers
4. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECcVEAcION (1965).
5. Seengerallyid.at 22-36.

6. The total amount of money involved is substantial. The aggregate cost to consumers
has been calculated to be over $500 million per year. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE
THEORYAND ITS APPLICATIONS 195-96 (5th ed. 1992). Divided over all consumers in the
United States, however, this works out to only about two dollars per consumer.
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are geographically concentrated in only a few states. This makes
it easier for them to organize and raise money for collective
action devoted to maintaining the quotas. Given their high
stakes and geographic concentration, farmers will be more likely
to pay attention to the issue, which wiU discourage free riders.
And the farmers have a preexisting associational structure, in
the form of farmers' organizations and marketing cooperatives
set up and supported by the government.
Legal scholars who have assimilated Olson's analysis have
occasionally concluded that it justifies greater judicial activism.
After all, if well-organized groups are over-represented in the
legislative process, and poorly-organized groups are underrepresented in that process, then perhaps social welfare would
be advanced by having courts decide these kinds of issues.
More recently, however, other public choice-influenced
scholars have successfully challenged this conclusion. One is
Einer Elhauge of Harvard Law School, who wrote a terrific
article a few years ago pointing out, among other things, that the
groups that are over-represented or under-represented in the
legislative or administrative process are likely also to be overrepresented or under-represented, as the case may be, in the
judicial process Another is Neil Komesar of Wisconsin Law
School, who recently wrote a book that takes the point one step
further. Komesar argues that the groups that are overrepresented or under-represented in the political process will
also be over-represented or under-represented, as the case may
be, in the courts andin the economic marketplace.9
As Elhauge and Komesar have demonstrated, it is not a valid
argument to point to some kind of failure in the political
process-like interest-group capture-and say that this means
we should have judicial activism. Such a shift may just replace
capture of the legislature with capture of the judiciary. To
return to my sugar cane quota example, it will not do to suggest
that consumers would be better off having the Agriculture
Department's quotas challenged in court-perhaps by arguing
that they violate the Administrative Procedure Act or the
Constitution. For the same reasons that consumers will be able

7. See supranote 2.
8. SeeElhauge, supranote 2, at 67-8.
9. SeeKomEsAR, supmnote 2, at 98-150.
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to transmit only a weak demand to the legislature for change,
they will be unlikely to mount any credible action in court. In
fact, as far as I am aware there have been no judicial challenges
to the sugar quotas brought on behalf of consumers.
But so far we have looked only at the demand side of the
equation. Perhaps when we turn to the supply side we can
discover some basis for differentiation between the legislature
and the courts as a source for law change. Here, I would suggest
two factors that are potentially significant."
The first I will call the minimum bid limitationfor procuring a
law change. The idea here is that neither the legislature nor the
courts will supply a change in law unless an interest group is
willing to pay at least a certain threshold price. This is easiest to
see with respect to the courts, so I will explain the idea in that
context first.
As should be obvious, one cannot produce a change in law
from the courts simply by writing a letter to Chief Justice
Rehnquist and saying "please change the law." Instead, you have
to file a lawsuit and frame the facts and the legal arguments in
such a way as to demonstrate the plausibility of a judgment that
embodies the desired legal change. Then, of course, you have to
have the resources and the skill to get the issue passed on by one
or more appeals courts, and perhaps ultimately by the Supreme
Court itself. All of this takes a significant amount of resourcessomeone has to pay the lawyers. It also requires organizational
skills, such as picking the right lawyers and the right cases,
coordinating the lawyers, and so forth.
How much does it take in order to mount a credible campaign
to get the courts to change the law? If the project entails both
trial court and appellate proceedings, I would guess that
something around $250,000 in resources (or the equivalent in
volunteer lawyering time) would be the minimum investment
necessary to be a serious player in the market for judicial
activism." In other words, the judicial supply curve does not

10. The following draws upon Thomas W. Merrill, InstitutionalChoie andPoliticalFaith,
22J.L. & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 1997).

11. Given these substantial threshold costs, the most common form of judicial
"lobbying" by interest groups takes the form of filing amicus briefs in an effort to
influence appellate courts in their resolution of cases filed by someone else. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Bradley & Paul Gardner, Underdogs, Upperdogs and the Use of the Amicus Brief.
Trends andlxplanations,10JUST. SYs.J. 78 (1985).
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peek its head out from the vertical axis until it starts to see bids
of at least $250,000 (see Figure 1 below).
The same point can be made with respect to the legislature,
although here it is more uncertain exactly what the minimum
bid might be. Every once in a blue moon someone writes an
editorial advocating a new law, key members of the legislature
read the letter and are persuaded by it, and a statute more or
less spontaneously results. But 99.9 percent of the time it does
not happen this way.
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If a group wants to have a law change seriously considered by
the legislature, it will have to mount a sustained and wellconceived campaign in pursuit of this end. The group will have
to motivate key legislators to embrace its proposal, perhaps by
showing them that the group has the ability to influence how a
significant number of votes will be cast in the next election, or
that the group can direct a large amount of campaign
contributions to the legislators, or that the group has significant
influence over the attitude that the media will adopt toward the
legislators in the near future. In other words, in order to be
taken seriously by legislators, the group has to command
significant resources or organizational backing, and has to make
a credible threat to deploy those assets in support of its request.
I have no idea what the exact magnitude might be of the
minimum bid for invoking the legislative supply curve. It would
depend on whether one is talking about the U.S. Congress, or a
state legislature, or a city council. 2 It would also depend on
whether the media is independently interested in the idea, and
so forth. But my guess would be that, on average, the magnitude
of the minimum bid, at least in the U.S. Congress, is much
higher than in court. Just to pick a number, let us say $2 million.
This means that the supply curve for law change from the
legislature does not peek its head out from the vertical axis until
we have passed a significantly higher threshold than is the case
for law change from the courts.'3
The concept of threshold costs, together with the reasonable
hypothesis that threshold costs are higher for legislative action
than for judicial action, has important implications for
determining the supply of law changes from legislatures and
courts. In effect, it establishes a kind of triage among groups.
12. As Madison recognized, the larger and more complex the governmental body, the
higher the cost of factional influence. SeeTHaFFEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
13.- It may be technically inaccurate to speak of "threshold costs" for legislative action.
If the legislature had no one bidding for its services, it would sell legislation for very little,
since opportunity costs would be zero. What I have called legislative threshold costs are
largely a function of the high level of demand for legislative services-for example, the
high opportunity costs to the legislature of attending to any one issue. From the
perspective of a group seeking law changes, however, the source of the high costs of
legislative action makes no difference. Thus, for ease of exposition I have used the term
"threshold costs" to refer to the minimum bid necessary to elicit a response from either
the courts or the legislature, even if in the case of the legislature the minimum bid Is
caused by demand from competing groups.
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Those able to transmit only a feeble demand-represented by
the downward-sloping demand curve D, in Figure 1-will elicit
no response from either the legislature or the courts. They are
nonplayers in terms of procuring law change. Most consumer
groups, taxpayer groups, members of future generations, and
the like will be so disorganized that they cannot make the
minimum bid necessary to secure a response from either the
courts or the legislature. Other groups, on the other handrepresented by the downward-sloping demand curve D--are so
powerful and well-endowed that they will be credible players in
both the legislative and the judicial markets for legal change.
These groups have the luxury of being able to choose which
segment of the market for legal change in which to operate.
Perhaps the most interesting groups are those in the middlerepresented by the downward-sloping demand curve D, . These
groups are sufficiently well-organized and have enough
resources to make a pitch for legal change in the courts, but
they cannot overcome the high threshold costs needed to
mount a credible campaign for change from the legislature.
Included in this category may be many ideologically-oriented
advocacy groups, such as civil rights groups, religious groups,
environmental groups, and property rights advocates. These
kinds of groups represent large numbers of people with fairly
small per capita stakes, and hence they cannot afford very much
in the way of campaigns for law change. For various reasons,
however, they have been able to develop a skeletal organization
and enough of a war chest occasionally to institute litigation (or
at least file amicus briefs) seeking legal change.
This analysis helps explain why most advocacy groups are
committed proponents of judicial activism, even if the cause
they are promoting is momentarily out of favor with the
judiciary. If a proposed legal change is fought out in the courts,
then advocacy groups will at least get a hearing and'have some
chance of prevailing. But if a legal change is determined by the
legislature, they will not even get in the door.
As a normative matter, the implications of the lower threshold
costs for seeking law change through the courts are less clear. If
you are a committed Burkean conservative who dislikes
discontinuous legal change, then perhaps you would want to
stamp out judicial activism. Judicial activism dramatically
expands the universe of groups that can make an effective pitch
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for law change, and hence presumably increases the total
amount of change that takes place. On the other hand, if you
love legal change (for example, if you are a lawyer), then you
should favor judicial activism, since it will churn up more
change.
Whether legal change is possible through judicial action may
also have an impact on the type of legal change that occurs.
Eliminating judicial activism would skew the market for legal
change in favor of well-endowed and well-organized groups. If,
as seems plausible to assume, the well-endowed and wellorganized groups are more likely to be economic groups (for
instance, labor unions, producer groups, and professional
groups), then eliminating judicial activism might tilt social
policy away from ideological causes in favor of purely bread-andbutter issues. Judicial activism therefore adds spice to the
pblitical system: issues like prayer in public schools and gay
marriage become potential objects of legal change whereas
otherwise they would be ignored.
The second factor I would introduce might be called the
maximum bid limitation. Again, the point is most easily explained
with reference to the courts, so let us start there. What is the
shape of the judicial supply curve as groups seeking law change
make higher and higher expenditures? There is no doubt that,
at least initially, the supply curve slopes upward to the right: the
higher the expenditures, the greater is the supply of lw change.
The cheapest form of participation would probably be filing an
amicus brief using volunteer or pro bono lawyers. As the group
is able to invest more resources, it can move on to doing things
like bringing test cases and using full- or part-time paid staff
lawyers. With even greater levels of expenditure, the group can
fund multiple test cases, hire a top-flight private law firm,
procure the filing of amicus briefs by other supporting groups,
and so forth. It is reasonable to assume that as the level of
investment in litigation effort rises, the supply elicited from the
courts, in terms of the probability of securing favorable rulings,
rises too.
After the litigation bills have piled up for a while, though, the
law of diminishing returns starts to set in. Once one has hired
Cravath, Swaine & Moore to file multiple lawsuits, and several
boutique Washington firms to file amicus briefs, what else
remains to be done? Hiring more and more lawyers will quickly
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generate coordination problems and may interfere with the
work product. In effect, there is a ceiling on how much one can
spend effectively in seeking legal change through litigation. We
can illustrate this in Figure 2 by indicating that after a point, the
supply curve for courts is perfectly inelastic-no further increase
in the level of expenditure by groups will yield a higher
expected payout. Exactly where the supply curve becomes
inelastic will depend on the nature of the issue; in the graph, I
have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that it occurs at around $1.5
million.
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In the legislative arena, it is much less clear that the supply
curve becomes inelastic, at least in the range of expenditures
that we are talking about. If the sugar farmers want to secure
legislation tightening quotas-or want to block efforts to
liberalize quotas-then the more they spend, the greater the
expected value of the legislative output. The more PAG
contributions, the more television ads about the need to protect
the family farm, and so on, the greater the likelihood of
favorable legislation. At some point, it is reasonable to assume
that limits will be reached, given restrictions on campaign
contributions, public revulsion against bribery, and the danger
of advertising overkill. But this will probably occur at a far
higher level of expenditure than will be the case with respect to
a campaign forjudicial activism.
If the foregoing conjecture is correct, then we have a second
way of distinguishing between the market for law change
through courts and legislatures: the judicial supply curve
becomes inelastic at much lower prices than the legislative
supply curve. Suppose you have two groups, one seeking a
change in the law and the other opposing it. Because of
differences in per capita stakes and organizational structures,
one group is able to transmit a demand for political action
reflected by the downward-sloping demand curve D. in Figure 2;
the other group is able to transmit a demand reflected by
demand curve D.. Notice that if the fight over the proposed
change in law occurs in the legislature, the better-organized and
better-funded group-Di--will almost certainly prevail. It will
outspend and outlobby its rival D2, and thus it will presumably
collect more votes for its preferred outcome. Indeed, D. cannot
even muster the resources necessary to get over the threshold
for participation in the legislative forum. For this reason alone,
as we have already seen, D., will strongly prefer to have the issue
resolved by the courts.
In addition, however, D 2 has more than just a fighting chance
in the judicial arena. Because of the position of the demand
curves and the inelasticity of the judicial supply curve at the
points where it intersects the demand curves, D, and D2 are
exactly evenly matched in terms of expected outcomes in the
judicial arena. Both groups operate in the portion of the judicial
supply curve where additional expenditures on litigation elicit
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no additional supply. In effect, the public choice dimensions of
choosing between D, and D2 have been neutralized.
How plausible is it that the disparities in group demand for
law change will be neutralized in the judicial forum? Obviously,
this will not happen in every case. With respect to many
controversies, groups that have low per capita stakes and poor or
nonexistent organization will not be heard at all-they will not
be able to surmount the threshold costs for participation in the
judicial arena. Other controversies in the courts will pit a group
that can reach the inelastic portion of the judicial supply curve
against a group that can participate, but only at a lower level on
the supply curve, in which case the first group will "outlitigate"
the second. Still other controversies will be ones in which
legislative action can trump a judicial outcome, with the result
that the group that can prevail in the legislature ultimately
4
triumphs even if the two groups are evenly matched in court.'
Nevertheless, it is plausible to believe that there is a range of
controversies decided in the courts where the organizational
capacities of the contending parties will have no effect on the
outcome. When this happens, the dispute will be resolved, as the
lawyers say, "on the merits," not on the basis of disparities in
group organizational capabilities.' s
We are now in a position to see why public choice theory may
provide a justification for judicial activism after all. It is not, as
the early public choice-influenced accounts suggest, because
legislatures and agencies are always subject to differential
interest group influence whereas courts are wholly immune
from the logic of collective action. Rather, the case for judicial
activism from a public choice perspective is more qualified.
Public choice theory suggests thatjudicial policy making may be
less susceptible to interest group distortions-but only within a
narrow range of controversies where, each of the contending
positions is represented by a group with significant (but not
necessarily equal) organization strength, and only when the

14. This last qualification helps explain why groups that favor judicial activism also
typically favor constitutionalizing large areas of law- constitutional decisions are more
difficult for legislatures to trump than are nonconstitutional decisions.
15. For some empirical support for this proposition as it applies to the Supreme
Court, see Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, LitigantStatus, and the DifferentWo Succes of
DirectPartiesBefore the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL Sc. REV. 464 (1992).
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outcomes reached in these circumstances will not be trumped by
a legislated solution.
In offering these observations, I am not in any sense
endorsing judicial activism. Interest group influence is only one
variable that should be considered in evaluating the
phenomenon of judicial activism. Other large and complicated
issues involving judicial competence and constitutional and
democratic legitimacy must also be evaluated.
The argument does help, however, to explain why so many law
professors are drawn to judicial activism. Public choice theory
makes it easy to understand why law professors who support
ideological advocacy groups favor judicial activism: the theory
tells us that advocacy groups will, on the whole, have a better
change of achieving success when social change comes from the
courts than when it comes from the legislature.
It is somewhat harder to explain why law professors
influenced by public choice theory also sometimes favor judicial
activism. As we have seen, however, public choice theory
suggests that the dynamics of interest group influence may be
neutralized in courts, at least under certain limited
circumstances. This feature of judicial decision making will be
appealing to those who are especially concerned by the
distorting influence of interest groups in legislative and
administrative proceedings.
What we have, then, is a kind of unholy alliance between
advocacy-oriented professors and public choice-influenced
professors, each supporting judicial activism, albeit for different
reasons. Given this coalition of perspectives, it should come as
no surprise that there are so few people left in the academy who
have anything good to say about judicial restraint.

